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INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of October 18, 2013, about a hundred activists stormed 
the headquarters of the Royal Institute in São Roque (São Paulo), Brazil. On 
the grounds that the institution, responsible for conducting tests for 
pharmaceutical companies, was subjecting animals to mistreatment. Facilities 
were ravaged and cages were forced open, so that around 178 beagle dogs 
were rescued. As reported by the invaders, six of the dogs had tumors and 
presented mutilations3. According to the Royal Institute, "animals must always 
be held in the best living conditions and health." In addition, statements were 
released claiming that cancer research had been hampered, while classifying 
the incident as a terrorist act4. 
                                                     
1 Jurist from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul- 2014 (Brazil). Currently scholarship 
student of the Master in Animal Law and Society at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain). 
Member of the Laboratory of Bioethics and Ethics Applied to Animals of the Pontifical Catholic University 
of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil). Member of the ADS research at the Autonomous University of Barcelona 
(Spain). 
2 Jurist from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul- 2014 (Brazil). Lawyer, member of the 
Brazilian Bar Association (OAB – Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, in portuguese) . 
3 ALVES, MARTHA (2013). Ativistas resgatam cães de laboratório de testes em São Roque. 
Folha de S. Paulo, 18 Oct. 2013. Available at 
<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2013/10/1358477-ativistas-invadem-laboratorio-em-
sao-roque.shtml>. Access on 16 Oct. 2014. 
4 FALCÃO, Márcio. (2013) Retirada de beagles de instituto foi ato ‘fora da lei’. Folha de S. 
Paulo, 23 Oct. 2013. Available at <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2013/10/1360890-
retirada-de-beagles-de-instituto-foi-ato-fora-da-lei-diz-ministro.shtml>. Access on 16 Oct. 2014. 
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The case had great resonance in the national and international media. 
The coordinator of the National Council for Animal Experiments Control in Brazil 
(CONCEA) at the time - who was also a board member of the private entity the 
Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC) - reported that the this lab 
"backed up the self-support of Brazil about new drugs” and, because of what 
happened, “millions of reals were thrown away, and years of research for the 
benefit of the Brazilian people and animals were also lost”5. In an official 
statement, the CONCEA affirmed that not only the Royal Institute was regularly 
registered within the agency, but its performance was in full compliance with the 
legal requirements for the use of animals in science6. 
From this perspective it is possible to catch a glimpse of both the 
awakening of Brazilian citizens with regard to the issue of animal testing, as this 
was the first activist action of this kind to take place in Brazil, and also realize 
the serious importance of the problem with which we are dealing. 
 
ANIMAL ETHICS 
Consequent to the awakening of society with regard to the treatment of 
animals, it is increasingly possible to observe and consider studies related to 
how animals should be treated and what is their status as living beings. All this 
progress leads us to a very important point in such a reflection: our use of non-
human animals and the research for ethically appropriate attitudes in this 
context. 
Among the various philosophical theories dealing with the animal 
condition, the following will be synthetically presented: the one of animal welfare 
and the one of animal rights, being the best known and those that have guided 
                                                     
5 CRUZ, Fernanda (2013). Beagles do Instituto Royal não sofriam maus-tratos. Agência Brasil, 
22 Oct. 2013. Available at <http://www.ebc.com.br/noticias/brasil/2013/10/caes-retirados-do-
instituto-royal-nao-sofriam-maus-tratos-diz-coordenador-do>. Access on 16 Oct. 2014. 
6 AGÊNCIA BRASIL (2013). Instituto Royal pode utilizar animais em pesquisa, diz ministério. 
Portal EBC,18 Oct. 2013. Available at <http://www.ebc.com.br/cidadania/2013/10/ministerio-diz-
que-instituto-royal-pode-utilizar-animais-para-pesquisa>. Access on 16 Oct. 2014. 
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the current debates. According to Naconecy (2006, p. 39-40): "The role of 
ethical theories is to guide our actions and direct our attitudes through moral 
judgments. A moral judgment is justified when it is supported by good 
reasons"7. 
An ethical theory is an attempt to answer the question whether we are 
acting ethically or not, and  to justify a decision. Naconecy8 identifies two types 
of theories: consequentialism and non-consequentialism. While the formulations 
from the first group classify a correct action as the one able to cause positive 
results and prevent the negative, those from the second group assume that, 
whatever the outcome, some actions are necessary. 
Utilitarianism, which is the main variant of consequentialism, alleges that 
"the right action is the one that is likely to result in the greatest possible amount 
of well-being (happiness or utility) to the largest possible number of the 
involved"9 (NACONECY, 2006: pg. 49). And, as the main variant of non-
consequentialism, we find the theory of rights, according to which "if it is true 
that A has a (moral) right to X, then it is wrong to deprive A of X, or prevent 
them to do X. If A has a right to do or have X, then someone has an obligation 
to provide A with X"10 (NACONECY, 2006, p. 49). Because of this emphasis on 
the concept of duty (obligations), the theory of rights is also defined as 
“deontology”. 
Both theories ascribe moral status to animals, which is the 
degree/intensity of the importance of the moral or material criterion of 
                                                     
7 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “A função das teorias éticas é guiar 
nossas ações e orientar nossas atitudes por meio de juízos morais. Um juízo moral estará 
justificado quando ele estiver apoiado em boas razões”.  
8 Ibidem. 
9 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “a ação correta é aquela que resulta 
provavelmente na maior quantidade possível de bem-estar (felicidade ou utilidade) para o 
maior número possível de envolvidos”. 
10 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “se é verdade que A tem um direito 
(moral) à X, então é errado privar A de X, ou impedir que A faça X. Se A tem um direito a fazer 
ou ter X, então alguém tem uma obrigação de fornecer X à A” 
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considerability, since the moral value is used in ethics as a synonym for a non-
instrumental value. Something has instrumental value when it is a means to 
another end, while something has a moral, intrinsic value, when it is an end in 
itself. According to Naconecy11: 
Animal ethics assigns moral value to the lives of 
animals and/or to the states that animals experience. This value 
requires us to (or generates a duty to) treat animals with 
respect, as this value is independent from the utility or the 
appreciation of the animal by humans. An ethicist can also 
understand that this value confers dignity to the animal, a 
dignity that deserves to be respected by us12. 
Animal Welfare 
Peter Singer, in his book Animal Liberation, argues that moral equality 
must be understood as a prescriptive principle: we should impartially consider 
the interests of those affected by our actions. Excluding the interests of 
nonhuman animals from such consideration, or assigning them a lower weight 
than that we confer to similar interests of the members of our species, results 
unacceptably arbitrary. 
Accordingly, the author (SINGER, 2010, p.10) affirms "equality is a moral 
idea, is not a simple assertion of fact," that is, "the defense of equality does not 
depend on intelligence, moral capacity or similar matters of fact". Singer 
moreover states that: 
The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group 
to another does not imply that we must treat them the same way, or 
grant them exactly the same rights. Whether we should do so will 
depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The basic 
principle of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and equal 
                                                     
11 NACONECY, Carlos M.. Ética & Animais: um guia de argumentação filosófica. Porto Alegre: 
Edipucrs, 2006, p. 62. 
12 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “A ética animal atribui valor moral à 
vida dos animais e/ou aos estados que os animais experienciam. Esse valor nos obriga à (ou 
gera um dever de) tratar os animais com o devido respeito, já que esse valor independe que o 
animal seja útil ou apreciado pelos humanos. Um eticista pode entender também que esse 
valor confere dignidade a um animal, dignidade esta que merece ser por nós respeitada”. 
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consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and 
different rights.13 
The arbitrary discrimination of nonhuman animals portrays what Singer 
calls speciesism, a term coined by Richard Ryder – in analogy with racism and 
sexism – which is "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of 
members of one's own species and against those of members of other species". 
Singer also claims that conducting experiments, such as drug testing, on a 
human being, would be considered incorrect, immoral, and would generate 
outrage. Thus, he asks: why do it on a dog? The scholar believes this to occur 
because we ascribe less value to non-human species, which takes form of 
"speciesism". According to SINGER14: 
Most human beings are speciesist. Ordinary human beings – 
not a few exceptionally cruel or heartless humans, but the 
overwhelming majority of humans – take an active part in, acquiesce in, 
and allow their taxes to pay for practices that require the sacrifice of the 
most important interests of members of other species in order to 
promote the most trivial interests of their own species. 
Another issue which the author raises is that there is no guarantee that the drug 
or substance tested on animals has the same effect in humans. Singer 
highlights: 
As well as exposing people to harm, testing on animals may 
lead us to miss out on valuable products that are dangerous to animals 
but not to human beings. Insulin can produce deformities in infant 
rabbits and mice, but not in humans. Morphine, which is calming to 
human beings, causes mice to go into drug frenzies.15 
                                                     
13 SINGER, Peter. Libertação Animal. São Paulo: Editora WMF Martins Fontes, 2010, p. 5. It 
appears worthwhile to quote an excerpt of the work to exemplify the previously explained 
formulation: “Many feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request. It does 
not follow that since these same people are campaigning for equality between men and women 
they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, 
it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a dog can't vote, it is meaningless to talk 
of its right to vote”. 
14 SINGER, Peter. Animal liberation. New York: Random House, 1990. p.11. 
15 Ibidem, p. 84. 
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Still, there is a consideration on how scientists see animals, if a 
relationship of respect and moral consideration exists or not. Bonella notes 
(2009, p. 512.): 
Almost no scientist sees the premature and unintentional death 
of his "guinea pigs" as a serious problem. Vertebrate animals used in 
science can feel pain, stress and fear. They may also be aware of the 
world around them and be interested in their own life. This is what 
science itself teaches us, but we do not need a lot of sophisticated 
information to know that (at least in the case of those born mammals). 
And beings that can suffer frustrations and experience the world from 
their subjective point of view have interests as us humans; They 
deserve the respect due to any patient who may also suffer and have a 
personal life.16 
Jeremy Bentham, classic utilitarian philosopher, defends the human duty 
of compassion for all beings vulnerable to pain and suffering. Bentham17 
identifies the capacity for suffering as the characteristic that assigns a being the 
right to equal consideration: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire 
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand 
of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is 
no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the 
caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that the number 
of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are 
reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. 
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, 
or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond 
comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an 
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were 
otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can 
they talk? but, Can they suffer?18 
                                                     
16 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “Quase nenhum cientista vê a morte 
prematura e intencional de suas cobaias como um problema sério. Os animais vertebrados 
usados pela ciência podem sentir dor, estresse e medo. Eles também podem ter consciência do 
mundo ao seu redor e interessar-se pela sua própria vida. Isso é o que a própria ciência nos 
ensina, mas não precisamos de muita informação sofisticada para saber disso (ao menos no 
caso dos mamíferos nascidos). E seres que podem sofrer frustrações e experimentar o mundo 
do seu ponto de vista subjetivo têm interesses como nós, humanos; merecem o respeito devido 
a qualquer paciente, que também pode sofrer e ter uma vida pessoal”. 
17 BENTHAM, Jeremy apud SINGER, Peter.Libertação Animal. São Paulo. Editora WMF 
Martins Fontes, 2010. 
18 Ibidem, p. 12. 
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On the basis of the formulations made by Bentham (founder of the 
reformist-utilitarian school), Singer affirms that the characteristic that gives a 
being the right to equal moral consideration is the vital capacity to suffer, not the 
faculty of reason or language. If a being suffers, there is no moral justification 
for refusing to take into account its suffering, and similarly "there can be no 
moral justification for regarding the pain (or pleasure) that animals feel as less 
important than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans" 
(SINGER, 2010, p. 24). 
Singer also points out that "pain and suffering are in themselves bad and 
should be avoided or minimized, regardless of ethnicity, gender or species of 
the being that suffers" (SINGER, 2010, p. 27). In the face of such a finding it is 
up to man to include nonhuman animals in their sphere of moral concern. 
Still, it's worth noting that the rejection of speciesism does not presume 
that we should treat all animals with the same consideration, regardless of their 
species. What it argues is that differences in treatment may never be justified 
simply by the belonging or not to a particular species. That is, if we consider 
acceptable the infliction of a certain wrong to a cow, a wrong that would be 
unacceptable if inflicted to a human being, we cannot justify our argument only 
on the grounds that the cow does not belong to the human species. 
It can be said that the landmark for the recognition of dignity or intrinsic 
value to a particular living being is in their ability to feel pain, which occurs due 
to the development of the central nervous system, a characteristic of the 
vertebrates. According to Singer (2010, p. 14), "the limit of sentience is the only 
defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others". Sentience is a 
neologism formed by the junction of the terms sensitivity and awareness. 
According to Naconecy:19 
(i) To say that an animal is sentient means that this animal 
(a) has the ability to sense, and (b) that he cares about how he feels. 
"To care for" means the ability to experience (subjective) satisfaction or 
frustration. 
                                                     
19 NACONECY, Carlos M. Ética & animais: um guia de argumentação filosófica. Porto Alegre: 
EDIPUCRS, 2006, p. 117. 
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(ii) In Animal Ethics in particular, to say that an animal is 
sentient is to say that the animal is (a) able to feel pain and (b) want it to 
end. [...] 
(v) Sentient animals interpret the sensations and information 
they receive from the environment through cognition (reason) and 
emotions. Sentience, however, is a more emotional than cognitive 
reaction to sensations. This causes the animal to feel, among other 
things, affection for their offspring, fear of being attacked, disgust for 
boredom and dislike of isolation.20 
Feijó holds physiological sensitivity as a criterion for morality, based on 
the identification of specialized receptors (nociceptors) that make a being 
sentient. "The pain or the feeling aimed at the animal’s protection, is produced 
by a stimulus received by existing specialized receptors called nociceptors 
existing in all animals, except for protozoa"21 (FEIJÓ, 2005, p.17). For the 
scholar, this fact justifies the entry of sensible non-human animals in the same 
moral community pertaining to human beings. 
Important to note is that the author makes a distinction between moral 
agents and moral patients, stating that, although both are members of the same 
moral community and are holders of intrinsic value, only moral agents are 
assigned duties. Although non-human animals are part of the moral community 
and have intrinsic value, they are not moral agents but moral patients "who 
cannot assume duties but hold basic rights that must be defended by moral 
agents"22 (FEIJÓ, 2005, p. 130). 
 
                                                     
20 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: (i) Dizer que um animal é senciente 
significa dizer que esse animal (a) tem a capacidade de sentir, e (b) que ele se importa com o 
que sente. “Importar-se om” implica a capacidade de experimentar satisfação ou frustração 
(subjetiva). (ii) Para a Ética Animal em especial, dizer que um animal é senciente equivale a 
dizer que o animal é (a)capaz de sentir dor e (b) esejar que ela acabe. [...] (v) Animais 
sencientes interpretam as sensações e informações que recebem do ambiente por meio de 
cognição (razão) e emoções. A senciência, todavia, é uma reação mais emocional do que 
cognitiva às sensações. Isso faz com que um animal tenha, entre outras coisas, afeição à 
prole, medo de ser atacado, desgosto ao tédio e aversão ao isolamento. 
21 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “A dor ou a sensação que visa à 
proteção animal é produzida por um estímulo captado por receptores especializados chamados 
nociceptores existentes em todos os animais, à exceção dos protozoários”. 
22 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “que não podem assumir deveres, mas 
que possuem direitos básicos que devem ser defendidos pelos agentes morais”. 




Tom Regan23, starting from a philosophical foundation of ethical matrix, 
supports the idea that humans and nonhuman animals are subjects of a life, 
which makes them equal from the moral point of view, and therefore 
repositories of the same respect and consideration. Thus, animals considered 
subjects of a life cannot be treated as mere objects, as simple means, but as 
protagonists of their own existence, that is, subjects of a life with an end in 
themselves24. The theory of animal rights has antagonistic points to the theory 
advocated by Peter Singer, previously presented. 
The inclusion in the same species, race, ethnicity or gender does not 
matter in the moral discussion of whether endowing or not a being with rights or 
respect, but rather the simple fact that this being exists. According to Regan: 
"From the moral point of view, each of us is equal because each of us is equally 
a somebody, not a something, the subject-of-a-life, not a life without a subject" 
(Regan, 2006, p. 61-62). Being animals subjects of a life, as well as humans, 
they also have rights to life, physical integrity and freedom. For Regan, Feijó 
affirms, subjects of a life are "beings who have conscience, have beliefs and 
desires, can conceive the future and have goals"25 (FEIJÓ, 2005, p. 103). 
Regan is totally against the use of non-human animals, condemning any 
kind of exploitation of animals by humans, including for food and the use in 
science. Unlike the utilitarian view (Peter Singer's position), his theory holds that 
"rights enshrine what is considered fundamental for him (the individual), even if 
                                                     
23 REGAN, Tom. Jaulas Vazias: encarando o desafio dos direitos dos animais./Tradução: 
Regina Rheda. Porto Alegre: Lugano, 2006.   
24 SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang. FENSTERSEIFER, Tiago. Direito Constitucional Ambiental. 4. ed. 
São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2014. 
 
25 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “os seres que apresentam consciência, 
apresentam crenças e desejos, podem conceber o futuro e ter metas”. 
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it does not meet the social utility or it produces the least benefit for most"26 
(NACONECY, 2004, p. 43). That is, animals as well as humans, have the moral 
right to be treated with respect, "something we fail to do every time we use our 
superior physical strength and general know-how to inflict harms on them in 
pursuit of benefits for humans" (REGAN, 1983, p. 43). 
Indeed, for Regan the relationship of respect would be the synthesis of 
fundamental rights (life, physical integrity, freedom) which is expressed through 
the value of dignity, thought also to include animals. It invokes human morality 
to consider not only the interests of the beings of the human species, but also 
the interests of all beings capable of suffering pain or damage as a 
consequence of the actions of moral agents. According to Gordilho27: 
Moral rights are certain basic freedoms which form the core of 
fundamental rights, the so-called basic freedoms such as the right to 
life, to freedom of movement and bodily integrity, so that any violation of 
those rights should be seen as an affront to democratic values.28 
For Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson29, Regan’s philosophy is a mixture of 
reason and emotion, not being tied to utilitarianism or any other traditional point 
of view. Regan's view can be considered radical, "in the original sense of the 
word: to get to the root" (MASSON in COHEN & REGAN, 2001). As per 
Masson, it is this treatment that allows us to say, on purely moral grounds, that 
there is no benefit for humanity which can make any experiment with animals 
less reprehensible. 
                                                     
26 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “os direitos resguardam o que é 
considerado fundamental para ele (o indivíduo), mesmo que isso não atenda à utilidade social, 
nem produza o menor benefício para a maioria”. 
27 GORDILHO, Heron José de Santana. Abolicionismo Animal. Salvador: Evolução, 2008. p. 74. 
28 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: “Direitos morais são determinadas 
liberdades básicas que constituem o núcleo duro dos direitos fundamentais, as denominadas 
liberdades básicas, como o direito à vida, à liberdade de locomoção e à integridade corporal, 
de modo que qualquer violação a esses direitos deve ser vista como um afronta aos valores 
democráticos”. 
 
29 MASSON in COHEN, Carl. REGAN, Tom. The Animal Rights Debate. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2001. 
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Furthermore, the author affirms that one of the main contributions of 
Regan is proposing an update of the famous statement by Jeremy Bentham30, 
known as one of the most important in the movement for animal rights. 
The question is not only can animals suffer but are they 
subjects-of-a-life? (…) Animals have a past, a story, a biography. Minks 
and bears, elephants and dolphins, pigs and chickens, cats and dogs: 
each is a unique somebody, not a disposable something. Think of the 
many implications: animals have mothers and fathers, often siblings, 
friendships, a childhood, youth, maturity. They go through life cycles 
much the way humans do (the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson earned his 
reputation by describing these phases in the lives of humans, but they 
are just as important in the lives of animals). (…) Opponents of Tom 
often say we cannot possibly know what makes an animal happy. 
Nonsense. Nothing could be easier. A cow wants to live, feed her 
young, to be outdoors in the natural world full of wind and sunshine and 
other natural things.31  
Tom Regan is considered an advocate of animal rights, active in the 
movement that defends such cause. For the author, this movement is 
abolitionist in its aspirations. The goal is not to reform the ways in which animals 
are exploited, making them "more humane". The goal is to definitely end such 
exploitation, which would mean: abolition of commercial animal farming, 
abolition of the fur industry and abolition of the use of animals in science32. 
The recognition of the rights of these animals has far-reaching 
consequences. The major animal user industries exploit these animals in 
billions. These are the animals whose lives are taken, whose bodies are injured, 
and whose freedom is denied by the fur industry and the meat industry, for 
example. All this emerges as morally wrong, once we acknowledge their moral 
rights. All this emerges as something that must be stopped, and not made more 
“humane". The task facing Animal Rights Activists is daunting: we must empty 
the cages, do make them larger.33 
That's why, even considering that the use of animals in scientific 
experiments, for example, has undoubtedly provided untold benefits in the field 
of medical research – and today many medical centers, pharmaceutical 
                                                     
30 Jeremy Bentham's phrase referred to in the text: "The question is not 'Can they reason?' Nor 
'They can talk' but 'Can they suffer?'". 
31 REGAN, Tom. Jaulas Vazias. Porto Alegre: Lugano, 2006, p. 4. 
32 COHEN, Carl. REGAN, Tom. The Animal Rights Debate. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2001, p. 127. 
33 REGAN, Tom. Jaulas Vazias. Porto Alegre: Lugano, 2006, p. 75. 
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companies and research institutions still greatly rely on the use of animals to 
find new remedies – if there is the assumption that animals have moral rights, 
research must compulsorily do without this practice, regardless of the obvious 
damage that this position would bring to mankind. In the book The Animal 
Rights Debate, Regan states that34: 
If what we (individually or as a society) are doing with animals is not 
morally justifiable, we ought to stop doing it, and we ought to seek to keep 
others from doing it. If animals really do have rights, those rights deserve 
protection, as do the rights of vulnerable humans. Laws may be adopted to 
forbid conduct that is now nearly universal; regulations may forbid acts and 
practices to which we have long been accustomed. Such laws and regulations 
may prove exceedingly inconvenient and very costly. But neither inconvenience 
nor cost can excuse us from fulfilling our obligations. I repeat for emphasis: if 
animals really do have moral rights, we humans have the moral duty to respect 
those rights. 
Given the above, Regan concludes that the current issue is strongly 
practical and that has nothing to do with animal welfare. According to the 
author, it’s the experiments for the sake of human health, above all other animal 
exploitation by humans, which will force us to thoroughly think about animal 
rights. 
CONCLUSION 
As an instrument to pursue the satisfaction of self-interest, humans often 
seek to interpret ethics as for their own benefit. NACONECY35 describes what 
can be understood as true ethics: 
Ethics is not about the "positive action for the desired result", 
the "good for something" (but the "positive action in itself," the "good in 
itself"). 
Ethics should not be confused with the norm of law. 
                                                     
34 COHEN, Carl. REGAN, Tom. The Animal Rights Debate. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2001, p. 6. 
35 NACONECY, Carlos. Ética e Animais: um guia de argumentação filosófica. Porto Alegre: 
EDIPUCRS, 2006. p.33. 
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Ethics is not a simple list of ad hoc rules. 
Ethics is not just a meeting of sundry intuitions. 
Ethics is not a simple reformulation of moral convictions in a 
sophisticated language (but a justification of them). 
Ethics does not only repeat the same moral judgments (but should be 
able to produce new).36 
The search for this interpretation favorable to humans, or the positioning 
of other interests before the ones of non-human animals, contributes to the use 
of the latter as resources in a systematic manner in many fields, always as to 
meet human needs. The word "use" already reflects the objectification of 
animals, which unfortunately is still strongly rooted in our society, leading to a 
picture of significant damage. 
The design at the base of such “use” is the idea that our moral 
obligations are intended as only directed to other humans (HORTA, 2009). 
Given these statements, it is possible to affirm that the majority of human 
beings hold a position of superiority with respect to animals of other species. 
However, this position according to which humans hold the position of 
the superior or most developed specie, at the same time, definitely entails a 
series of responsibilities we are merely taking, including consideration we owe 
to other lives. These responsibilities, especially when it comes to animals, are 
not taken satisfactorily. Further, with regard to this perspective, it is noteworthy 
to underline that many of the claims that had been employed in order to use 
                                                     
36 Translation by the author. Original text in Portuguese: A Ética não trata da “ação boa para um 
fim desejado”, o “bom para algo”, (mas da “ação boa por si mesma”, o “bom por si mesmo”). A 
Ética não se confunde com as normas do direito. A Ética não é uma simples lista de regras ad 
hoc. A Ética não é uma mera reunião de intuições avulsas. A Ética não é uma simples 
reformulação de convicções morais numa linguagem sofisticada (mas uma justificação delas). 
A Ética não apenas repete os mesmos juízos morais (mas deve ser capaz de produzir novos).   
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animals in a way that was convenient to humans, were annihilated after the 
Cambridge Declaration. 
On July 7, 2012,  the University of Cambridge (UK) held a conference 
entitled Francis Crick Memorial Conference, on the topic "Consciousness in 
Human and Non-Human Animals", where the neural bases of consciousness in 
human and non-human animals were addressed. Among the 13 scientists who 
lectured, there were Christof Koch, Stephen Hawking and Philip Low, among 
other doctors from important institutions such as Caltech, MIT (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) and the Max Planck Institute. The result of this 
conference was to draw up a statement, where 25 highly regarded researchers 
admitted that animals do have consciousness, including birds, monkeys, 
elephants, octopuses, dogs, dolphins etc., as it was recognized that the brain 
signals of these animals were similar to those of humans. In the words of 
PHILIP LOW37: 
Evidence demonstrates that humans are not the only ones to show 
mental states, feelings, intentional actions and intelligence; as scientists, we felt 
we had a professional and moral duty to report these observations to the public. 
It's an inconvenient truth: it was always easy to say that animals have no 
conscience. Now we have a group of respected neuro-scientists who study the 
phenomenon of consciousness, animal behaviour, the neural network, anatomy 
and genetics of the brain. You can no longer say that we did not know. This is a 
delicate matter. Our role as scientists is not what society should do, but we 
make public what we found. Society will now have a discussion about what is 
happening and may decide to formulate new laws, more research to understand 
the consciousness of the animal or somehow protect them. Our role is to 
provide information. 
The insertion of such a finding in the academic and scientific community 
represents a major step as regards the arguments used in favor of animal 
protection. Thanks to its sound foundations and to the names of renowned 
scientists, this finding in the field of neuroscience can no longer be rejected or 
denied. This leads us to believe that a new ethic reflection regarding the moral 
                                                     
37 LOW, Philip. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness. Available at: 
<http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf.>  Accessed on: 
05/05/2014. 
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value of animals could emerge and involve a great part of society if all these 
scientific data (which affirm that we, humans, are not the only living being that 
have the capacity to feel, learn and build social relations) were diffused and 
addressed in a satisfactory way. 
Many still believe that only science, the one of the main institutions of 
global studies, can prove all we can already see and feel with our own eyes or 
discover through very superficial studies: the existence of consciousness and 
sentience in many animals. It is undeniable that when we see the way in which 
animals live their lives, the way they care for their offspring and their own 
interests, always trying to survive in this world that already seems to have no 
room for them, touches us as human beings. Deep down, even the misbeliever, 
will always know that these beings have as much right to live well in this world 
as we do. 
Translation by Chiara Bellone de Grecis38 
 
                                                     
38 Graduated  in Political Sciences, bachelor degree, and in a Master in International Relations, both 
obtained at the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome(Italy). Currently student of the Master in Animal Law 
and Society at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Spain).  
